The Wikipedia page for that case further explains:

> More importantly, the Court determined that Barker did not want a speedy trial (a fact that Barker's counsel conceded at oral argument). The Court speculated that Barker's reason was his gambling on Manning's acquittal (the evidence against Manning not being strong as evidenced by two hung juries and two appellate court reversals), believing that if Manning was acquitted, he would never be tried (which Barker's counsel also conceded at oral argument). The Court further noted that, after Barker's counsel objected to the February 1962 continuance, he did not object to the June or September 1962 continuances; only in March 1963, after Manning's convictions became final, were objections raised to further continuances (this time brought about by the ex-sheriff's illness, which Barker conceded was a justifiable reason).

As the Court pointed out, the right to a speedy trial is different than other rights because in many cases the defendant wants to drag out the process, especially if they are free on bail. I don't think it's "ignoring the Constitution" for the court to take that into account in deciding whether a Defendant's right to a speedy trial was actually violated.