It is really as simple as that. Could you imagine a system in which car insurance wasn't mandated but car insurance companies were required to repair your car regardless of its preexisting condition? No smart person would preemptively buy insurance. You just wait until your get into an accident and then bring the already damaged car to the insurance company and demand a policy to repair it. No insurance company can work like that.
Insurance only works when the costs of the most expensive customers are shared among the cheapest customers. You need incentives to encourage the cheap customers to sign up or the whole system falls apart. Rejecting preexisting conditions is the old capitalist way of incentivizing people, but as soon as that is prohibited nearly all incentives disappear for a healthy person to buy into the system.
That is not insurance. That is a wealth redistribution. Those are not the same thing, although the current discourse around health insurance conflates those two concepts, for obvious political reasons.
> Could you imagine a system in which car insurance wasn't mandated but car insurance companies were required to repair your car regardless of its preexisting condition? No smart person would preemptively buy insurance. You just wait until your get into an accident and then bring the already damaged car to the insurance company and demand a policy to repair it. No insurance company can work like that.
Actually, this would be completely feasible to implement. The insurance company would price you based on your risk. In this case, P(risky event | all available information) = 1), so there wouldn't be much of a point to buying the insurance, but it absolutely would work.
The problem is that the ACA also forbids insurers from underwriting plans based on anything other than age, income, zip code, and whether or not they smoke. That's guaranteed to increase the cost both for healthy and for unhealthy patients, because they have to make overly conservative estimates when evaluating the risk level of their patient pool.
Yes, they are the same thing. Insurance is fundamentally a redistribution of risk with money being shifted from those who have not fallen victim to that risk to those who have. If you have a problem with that aspect of the ACA, you have a problem with the general idea of insurance.
>The insurance company would price you based on your risk (in this case, it would be 100%), so there wouldn't be much of a point to buying the insurance, but it absolutely would work.
You do realize that this is functionally the same as getting rid of the preexisting conditions protection, right? Whether someone pays tens of thousands to a doctor for care or to an insurance company for coverage are in practice exactly the same. The whole point is that many of us think that is a fundamentally unfair system to force someone to face in that situation.
This comment is so profoundly misguided that I have to comment.
Insurance does not work the way you describe. When companies do a fundraiser where someone gets to take a half-court shot with a basketball and win $1M if they make the shot, an insurance policy sells the company doing the fundraiser a policy that reflects the odds that a person chosen at random from the audience will sink the shot. That policy might cost $7K, since the shot will very likely be missed.
The insurance company makes a profit by charging a bit more than the actual odds reflect, so that over time if 200 shots are taken, it pays the $1M once and profits $400K. In a competitive market, the price of insurance will approach the probability.
Similarly, an insurance company might offer insurance that it will not rain on the last weekend in July. Perhaps an outdoor wedding facility wishes to buy that policy, but a farmer wishes to buy the other side of that risk. In such cases, the insurance company can charge less because there is a market for both sides of the uncertain event. Futures markets are also used for this purpose.
Most of our modern health care is not really risk-driven, it's based on markets that are highly regulated and prices that are influenced by lobbyists from various industries etc.
The key problem with your assertion is that at the time insurance is purchased, nobody knows who will be the victim or whether there will be a victim. Purchasers of insurance would rather spend a little bit of money just in case a bad outcome occurs, so they don't bear the full brunt of that bad outcome. Those who don't end up with a bad outcome don't get their money back, which is why the system works.
We all know there is a need for social services to provide healthcare for those who can't afford it or who have really bad luck. That's not insurance, however, it's social services.
No, they are not the same thing. The fact that a transfer of money happens is not a sufficient criterion for defining insurance.
Take two people with different risk profiles but who are both insured. If you can tell a priori which one is expected to have lifetime claims that exceed their lifetime premiums, then you don't have insurance - you have a wealth redistribution scheme[0].
Note that I didn't specify which person had the greater risk profile, or whether they both purchased the same "tier" of plan, or even whether they purchased their insurance from the same insurer. This property of insurance still holds even if the two people have completely different risk profiles, if one purchases a gold plan and the other a bronze, and if one person purchases from MegaInsurance in New York and the other purchases from AcmeInsurance in California - as long as they are both insured at risk-adjusted rates.
> You do realize that this is functionally the same as getting rid of the preexisting conditions protection, right? Whether someone pays tens of thousands to a doctor for care or to an insurance company for coverage are in practice exactly the same. The whole point is that many of us think that is a fundamentally unfair system to force someone to face in that situation.
First, nobody is paying tens of thousands of dollars to a doctor, because there's an out-of-pocket maximum cap. (And that cap could still exist under a risk-based pricing world.)
Second, it's not, functionally the same, because that doesn't mean that you can't separately provide income- or wealth-based subsidies if you're aiming to redistribute wealth. But that happens at a completely different layer from the risk underwriting - and because the underwriting process is allowed to properly account for a person's risk profile, you end up with lower aggregate premiums (pre-subsidy). Lower unsubsidized premiums means that you don't need to subsidize as much money in order to achieve the same sticker-price premiums that consumers see - in other words, the entire process is significantly cheaper for what appears to be the same result to the patient.
The reason we don't do this, even though it would be significantly cheaper, is because it's politically infeasible.
[0] Which, you may note, is currently the case - and that's because health insurance as it stands is a mishmash of two completely unrelated products ("insurance" and "wealth redistribution") that we happen to try to stuff into the same box.
Our failure to find a non-insurance 'hammer' with which to hit all of the health 'nails' is a larger issue.
You can offer insurance against an event that has already occurred, but the insured price will always be slightly higher than the uninsured price. One could call that insurance, but it'd be a degenerate case, so at that point it's more of a word puzzle than a real question.
> Our failure to find a non-insurance 'hammer' with which to hit all of the health 'nails' is a larger issue.
Exactly - the problem is that people talk about health insurance like it's supposed to solve the problems that a wealth redistribution program would. Except, insurance is not a wealth redistribution mechanism - it has a completely different goal - and trying to turn it into one just results into the worst of all worlds (expensive and ineffective at achieving either goal).
What are you going to do? Not let me die?
And they screwed that part up. As a healthy young person, there is no incentive to buy massively overpriced, shitty high-deductible ACA plans, when one month of coverage costs more than the IRS penalty.
True. And the ACA now levies a tax penalty for those that don't sign up for insurance (2.5% of income, max ~$2K).[1]
[1] https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/health/how-much-is-the-obama...
