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0 pointsnaasking10y ago0 comments

> The evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies is in your living room, if you have a television. You can see people on it and they behave intelligently. Are they conscious? Of course not, they're just red, green, and blue dots.

I don't see how that constitutes evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies. They're obviously distinguishable from conscious entities with a simple test: ask a TV person a question.

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DonaldFisk10y ago· 2 in thread

The TV person is obviously distinguishable, but the non-playing character in the VR I described would not be.

naaskingOP10y ago

And your VR example simply assumes the conclusion:

> Maybe Doug Lenat and Geoffrey Hinton collaborated and developed an AI as intelligent as a person, and that's what controls them

How do you know the AI isn't conscious? You're simply asserting that it isn't. For all you know, "AI as intelligent as a person" literally isn't possible without consciousness, which makes your assertion inconceivable.

Which is why the whole p-zombie thought experiment doesn't convince anyone: if you already think consciousness is physical, then p-zombies aren't conceivable and the thought experiment isn't convincing, and if you already think consciousness is not physical, then p-zombies merely assert the same conclusion you already hold and you're "convinced".

DonaldFisk10y ago

The computer that runs the VR (including the AI controlling the behaviour of the NPCs) might well be conscious, but the NPCs themselves are just pixels. Before you argue that you are too, you know otherwise and you see the VR's pixels. Meanwhile, the computer which is generating the VR, and is outside it, doesn't have to see anything. It might sense some electrical signals originating from you and your friend's bodysuits, but that isn't going to feel anything like the experience you and your friend are having.

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