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0 pointsAmezarak10y ago0 comments

> They don't overly care about access to this particular iPhone. They're taking this case through the courts so that they can establish a precedent that allows them to force manufacturer cooperation to unlock any phone.

This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact.

I could just as well argue that yes, the FBI really does care a lot about this particular iPhone, and that's why the asked-for update is to be keyed to this iPhone and only this iPhone.

At the same time, even assuming that is true, we're talking about the FBI going through a legal process, reviewed by a judge, to get the data off one phone at a time. If that's how it works every time, I don't see a problem; that is how the system is supposed to work. I am kind of baffled as to why we're cheerleading the fact that Apple is refusing to perform what appears to be a perfectly reasonable request that is being made in accordance with the law. If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems.

Also, apparently this 'precedent' has already been set; according to a link in the article, Apple had previously offered custom firmware images to law enforcement after a court order that bypassed the lock screen on earlier iPhones.

http://www.cnet.com/news/how-apple-and-google-help-police-by...

0 comments

oxymoron10y ago

US law enforcement has an impressive track record of extending their authority through unilateral reinterpretation of the US code. Once it's been established that Apple are able to extract data, what's to prevent agencies from slapping Apple with gag orders and forcing them to comply under completely opaque proceedings, that may not even have a way of appeal? I think Apple is right in resisting while it's still in the open. For all we now, this might really be about forcing them to demonstrate the technical capability to cooperate for use with in one or several secret cases we do not now.

rconti10y ago

Every comment I've read so far has said that Apple should help in this instance, so I don't see the cheerleading-- yet. Except now I may provide it. I just read Apple's letter to customers, and now I agree with them that the very creation of backdoor software -- even if it's only meant to help in specific instances -- is a dangerous thing. Applying specialized knowledge that Apple has about iOS and iPhones, plus Apple's engineers, to creating an innovative backdoor that does not exist today, means that it can never be un-designed. It will never have fewer people aware of it, unless you kill them after they create the software. The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak. The engineers can only get conveniently hired by a competitor or foreign government or our own government. I agree, it is troubling.

uxp10y ago

> creating an innovative backdoor that does not exist today, means that it can never be un-designed

Wasn't it just yesterday a story was published about an upcoming documentary about the STUXnet virus that claims that the US and Israel developed it in secret together and had a very successful, but very limited use for it. Only when Israel allegedly went off on their own to modify and deploy it did it spread wide and far, popping up on the radar of anti-malware companies and getting researched and publicized.

Like what you said, after the exploit/backdoor/software is designed, it can never be un-designed. It will exist as a tool that can only be mitigated, but not destroyed.

sliverstorm10y ago

The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak.

Then why don't we have Apple's private keys yet?

Plenty of companies keep a lot of things very secret, including things like powerful debug modes, for a long time. At least long enough that everybody forgets the details and the software has long since rotted away.

dottedmag10y ago

Because it's Apple who keeps them, not FBI.

Nobody in FBI would give a damn about leaking the patched OS image: it's Apple's reputation on stake, not FBI's.

2 more replies

jljljl10y ago

If Apple rotates their keys, that means that their private keys can be unlearned, whereas a method to backdoor iPhones could not be unlearned in the same way.

1 more reply

ec10968510y ago

Replying to the reply: the FBI doesn't want this leaked because it would jeopardize their own agent's apple devices.

chishaku10y ago

> This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact.

No. You don't have to assume that law enforcement or intelligence agencies are bad faith actors to see they are constantly seeking to expand their powers.

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-...

https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters

http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-d...

https://epic.org/foia/fbi/lpr/

scott_s10y ago

Amezarak is not (necessarily) assuming they are bad faith actors. Amezarak is pointing out, I think correctly, that the parent poster is inferring intent of an organization from its actions. Without specific documents from that organization spelling out that intent, I agree that such inference is analysis and not fact. It may be reasonable or even probable analysis, but that does not make it fact.

themartorana10y ago

Also we don't have to assume it because we know it for a fact - they are bad faith actors.

rfrank10y ago

> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems.

Given what we know about government surveillance programs, why would one assume the government is a good faith actor when it comes to encryption?

settsu10y ago

> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems.

It needn't be "always", just (perceived as) too often. It seems fair to say the broad sentiment is that the national security arms of U.S. government have broached that barrier.

gozur8810y ago

>At the same time, even assuming that is true, we're talking about the FBI going through a legal process, reviewed by a judge, to get the data off one phone at a time. If that's how it works every time, I don't see a problem...

And how will we ensure that's the case? Once they have the firmware they need they can install it on other phones.

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse

0 pointsAmezarak10y ago0 comments

This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact.

I could just as well argue that yes, the FBI really does care a lot about this particular iPhone, and that's why the asked-for update is to be keyed to this iPhone and only this iPhone.

http://www.cnet.com/news/how-apple-and-google-help-police-by...

0 comments

oxymoron10y ago

rconti10y ago

uxp10y ago

> creating an innovative backdoor that does not exist today, means that it can never be un-designed

Like what you said, after the exploit/backdoor/software is designed, it can never be un-designed. It will exist as a tool that can only be mitigated, but not destroyed.

sliverstorm10y ago

The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak.

Then why don't we have Apple's private keys yet?

dottedmag10y ago

Because it's Apple who keeps them, not FBI.

Nobody in FBI would give a damn about leaking the patched OS image: it's Apple's reputation on stake, not FBI's.

2 more replies

jljljl10y ago

If Apple rotates their keys, that means that their private keys can be unlearned, whereas a method to backdoor iPhones could not be unlearned in the same way.

1 more reply

ec10968510y ago

Replying to the reply: the FBI doesn't want this leaked because it would jeopardize their own agent's apple devices.

chishaku10y ago

> This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact.

No. You don't have to assume that law enforcement or intelligence agencies are bad faith actors to see they are constantly seeking to expand their powers.

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-...

https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters

http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-d...

https://epic.org/foia/fbi/lpr/

scott_s10y ago

themartorana10y ago

Also we don't have to assume it because we know it for a fact - they are bad faith actors.

rfrank10y ago

> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems.

Given what we know about government surveillance programs, why would one assume the government is a good faith actor when it comes to encryption?

settsu10y ago

> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems.

It needn't be "always", just (perceived as) too often. It seems fair to say the broad sentiment is that the national security arms of U.S. government have broached that barrier.

gozur8810y ago

And how will we ensure that's the case? Once they have the firmware they need they can install it on other phones.

j / k navigate · click thread line to collapse