A summary (that links to the opinion) tends to be more useful to non-specialists than a document beginning with: "United States of America v. In the Matter of the Application of the United States, No. 3:2015mc00021 - Document 1 (N.D. Ill. 2015)"
Even if they have permission, do you think that's as stringent as it would be if they had to subpoena this from the network? Some agencies are using these things daily, or hundreds of times in a few years, without even telling the courts.[1] The FCC only approved them for emergency use.[2] They are probably not licensed for most of the times they are used, even if the network says OK.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stingray_phone_tracker#Interce... [1] http://www.wired.com/2014/03/stingray/ [2] http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/new-e-mail-shows-...
Does this mean they cannot run sessions separated by > 48 hours, since no diff would be possible afterwards?
i guess with the W = warrant
I often think of the current research chemical market in regards to this: a poorly understood drug like MDPV makes the rounds on the internet, someone decides to take the risks for the rewards in the gray-area and makes it widely available, someone buys it at a gas station and ends up in the hospital after doing something dumb, a panic ends up getting it banned, and a short while later the cycle restarts with a new drug that is still in the gray-area of the law.
When is the government going to embrace open source as a basis for security of users?
> First, law enforcement officers must make reasonable efforts to minimize the capture of signals emitted from cell phones used by people other than the target of the investigation. [...] Moreover, law enforcement officers must not use a cell-site simulator when, because of the location and time, an inordinate number of innocent third parties’ information will be collected.
> Second, law enforcement officers must immediately destroy all data other than the data identifying the cell phone used by the target. The destruction must occur within forty-eight hours after the data is captured. [...] Additionally, the destruction must be evidenced by a verification provided to the Court with the return of the warrant.
> Third, law enforcement officers are prohibited from using any data acquired beyond that necessary to determine the cell phone information of the target.
Police dogs are known for being trained to deliver false positives, i.e. saying "drugs" when the are no drugs. Couldn't STINGRAY et al be used to the same effect? I.e.: "the suspect showed a pattern predictive of child pornography" being used as a pretext for executing a warrant?
Where is this wrong? Is there any evidence in favor of this interpretation?
